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ABSTRACT  
We use data from the Greek Labour Force Survey to calculate, by region and year, the 
share of youths who coreside with their parents as a proxy of mutual dependence 
between parents and adult children, and the share of youths who coreside with their 
parents and also receive cash transfers as a proxy of one-way dependence of youths on 
parents. Using panel data analysis, we examine the correlation of each variable with the 
youth unemployment rate. We find that familial interdependence was strong before the 
crisis and intensified further during the crisis while at the same time it was transformed 
from two- to one-directional. Parents stepped in to shelter unemployed and vulnerable 
youths, mostly young men, and did so by providing housing rather than cash. 
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1. Introduction  
The Greek ‘great recession’ has been widely documented as the most severe and 
prolonged recession in the advanced world during peacetime. Over 2009-2015 the 
Greek economy lost all growth since its eurozone entry, with GDP per capita contracting 
to levels not seen since 1999 and unemployment rates climaxing at 27%.  Not 
surprisingly, youths were among those affected particularly hard. Youth unemployment 
peaked at shocking rates in 2013; exceeding 58% among 15-24 year-olds, 43% among 
25-29 year-olds, and 30% among 30-34 year-olds (Eurostat LFS-series).   
This disproportionate deterioration in labor market outcomes and the consequent 
economic distress put youths at an increased risk of depression and suicide (Drydakis 
2015, Economou 2013 & 2016) while, among those who kept their sanity, many fled the 
country to look for work elsewhere, with the trend including mostly the high-skilled (see, 
for example, Ifanti et al. 2014 for the brain drain of young Greek doctors). The majority 
did remain, however, and somehow managed to pull through even though there were 
hardly any public safety nets on which they could rely (Matsaganis 2013 & 2015). In this 
paper we study the only safety net that has been consistently available to struggling 
youths both before and during the recent crisis: that of the Greek family. Our main 
research question is whether Greek families have increased their support to their young 
members during the crisis and, if so, to what degree and in what form. In investigating 
this question, we also provide evidence on the demographic, economic, and cultural 
factors that instigate intergenerational dependency. 
The transition to adulthood for young Greeks has traditionally been slow and supported 
to a great extent by the family.  Researchers have shown that Greece fits well into the 
standard South-North divide of European families according to which youths in Southern 
Europe continue to coreside with their parents well beyond their adulthood, even at 
periods of rather favorable economic and labor market conditions, whereas those in 
Northern Europe leave their parental home much earlier (e.g. see Iacovou 2002 for 
evidence from the mid-90s). While families in Southern Europe also give young adults 
cash transfers, the predominant form of support they provide is in terms of housing, in 
contrast to Northern Europe where the data show the opposite pattern (Albertini et al. 
2007 study cross-country differences in 2004; Isengard et al. 2017 do the same for 2015). 
This latter distinction, however, is relatively muted in the case of Greece. In comparison 
to Italy and Spain, for example, the difference in prevalence of coresidence and 
intergenerational transfers in Greece is small. Thus, the Greek family can be seen as a 
special case of the South-European paradigm, supporting vulnerable youths by providing 
cash or shelter or both, as needed.      
Focusing on living arrangements, Giuliano (2007) argued for and empirically 
substantiated a cultural interpretation for the observed cross-country patterns, 
whereby familial coresidence depends on social norms about family structure. Strong 
and close-knit family ties in South European countries yield higher intergenerational 
coresidence rates, whereas the emphasis on individualism and independence in 
countries of Northern Europe yields lower coresidence rates. Although this 
interpretation is broadly convincing, economic factors are also at play. A large empirical 
literature has demonstrated that young adults decide whether or not to leave their 
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parental home based on rental prices (Börsch-Supan 1986, Haurin et al. 1993, Ermisch 
& DiSalvo 1997, Ermisch 1999, Rogers & Winkler 2014), their own labor outcomes and 
incomes as well as those of their parents (McElroy 1985, Becker et al. 2010, Manacorda 
& Moretti 2006, Chiuri & Del Boca 2010, Dettling & Hsu 2014, Engelhardt et al. 2016), 
and general economic cycles or labor market conditions (Card & Lemiux 2000, Lee & 
Painter 2013, Bitler & Hoynes 2015, Matsudaira 2016, Wiemers 2017). Economic factors 
are also highly responsible for the determination of intrafamily financial transfers. Young 
adults are more likely to receive cash from their parents when their parents’ income is 
high, their own income is low, or when they face borrowing constraints (Cox 1990, Cox 
and Jappelli 1990, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1994, McGarry and Schoeni 1995, Altonji et 
al. 1997, Schoeni 1997, Zilcha 2003, McGarry 2016) – though  some findings suggest 
that, all else equal, parents may give more generous transfers when their children’s 
incomes are higher in exchange for receiving reciprocal support from them at old age or 
when in need (Cox 1987, Cox and Rank 1992). 
What our paper adds to this large literature is the unique perspective of the Greek 
experience. Given that Greek families have a long tradition of supporting young adult 
members, the tremendous variation in economic conditions before and during the great 
recession allows us to reassess the influence of economic factors relative to that of 
culture on intergenerational dependency. Specifically, we draw data from the Labor 
Force Survey (LFS) to create a panel of the 13 Greek regions and 15 years (from 2002, 
when the country entered the eurozone, until the end of the great recession in 2016) 
and we use this panel to test (i) the long-run relationship of the youth unemployment 
rate with the share of youths who live with their parents (which measures familial 
interdependence); (ii) the long-run relationship of the youth unemployment rate with 
the share of youths who live with their parents and receive intrahousehold monetary 
transfers (which measures youth dependence on parents); and (iii) whether there is a 
structural break in these two relationships related to the crisis. This exercise serves as a 
close counterpart to a different study, where we focus specifically on living 
arrangements and test for structural breaks at a more disaggregated level of analysis, 
i.e. by using pooled cross-sections of the individual-level LFS data (Christopoulou and 
Pantalidou 2017).  
Apart from our own work, there is no other Greek-specific study that has 
comprehensively examined the role of the family as a fallback mechanism for young 
adults and its dynamic evolution. The only relevant paper by Karagiannaki (2011) 
provides an informative outlook on the living arrangements of individuals ages 65 and 
older before Greece’s entry to the eurozone but, in comparison to our research, its focus 
is rather narrow as it analyzes only coresidence outcomes and only for those youths who 
live with elderly parents. Among the cross-country studies that include Greece, none 
tests for the cyclicality of familial support by exploiting temporal variation (e.g. Albertini 
et al. 2007 and Isengard et al. 2017 rely on cross-country variation at a certain point it 
time). Finally, among other country-specific studies that do test for cyclicality effects, 
none finds a statistically significant change of intergenerational dependency during a 
recession period. Our study is also distinct in this regard. 
Indeed, our analysis shows that a two-way intergenerational dependency has 
characterized the Greek families before the crisis; that is, the generation that had the 
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means supported the generation in need. This dependency, however, has strengthened 
further during the crisis and has turned asymmetrical, with young people becoming 
mostly recipients rather than providers of support. Thus, despite the pre-existing 
cultural component behind the family safety net, when labor market conditions became 
critically adverse, families responded cyclically, taking extra action to shield their young 
members from the impact of the crisis. Notably, families responded by providing 
housing only (instead of both housing and monetary transfers), which was most likely 
by necessity not by choice, as the generalized economic hardship also affected older 
adults. Another interesting result is that the crisis induced families to protect young men 
more than young women, a result which further illustrates the role of cultural norms. 
Unlike men, stereotypical young women coreside with their parents and receive their 
financial support irrespective of the crisis; i.e. even when there are employment 
opportunities in the labor market that would enable them to live independently. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 gives a description of the data, presents 
descriptive statistics, and discusses the method of estimation; section 3 presents our 
results; and section 4 provides concluding remarks.  
 
2. Empirical Strategy 
2.1 Data 
As we mentioned already, we derive the data with which we conduct our analysis from 
the Greek Labor Force Survey. The LFS is conducted quarterly every year by the Hellenic 
Statistical Authority on a random representative sample of individuals and covers 
detailed information on a variety of demographic characteristics and financial 
outcomes, including household composition, employment status, and sources of non-
labor income. Taking the second quarter of the LFS as representative for each year, we 
use the mother ID, father ID, and spouse ID variables to identify those youths (ages 18-
35) who coreside with their parents or parents-in-law. We also use self-reports of 
income sources to identify those youths who receive cash transfers from other 
household members3. With these data we calculate the share of youths who coreside 
and the share of youths who coreside and receive transfers4 for each of the 13 Greek 
regions in each year over 2002-2016.  Likewise, for each region and year, we calculate 
the youth unemployment rate using self-reports of employment status. 
 
                                                     
3 This variable refers to income from other household members and not specifically from parents, because 
the LFS data do not allow us to identify who exactly is the donor of the cash transfer. This is somewhat 
problematic for our analysis, as we cannot tell apart married youths who live with their parents but share 
financial resources with their spouses from married youths who rely on their parents for both cash and 
shelter. 
4 The LFS data does not allow us to identify youths who receive cash transfers from their parents when 
they live independently. 
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Figure 1. Youth unemployment rate and the share of youths who coreside only or 
coreside and receive intrafamily transfers  
 
To give a sense of the temporal evolution of these variables we plot the country-level 
means in Figure 1. Over 2002-2008, youth unemployment (dashed line) is more or less 
stable at 10% for men and 20% for women but, as soon as the crisis begins, these rates 
start growing with large speed. Youth unemployment peaks in 2013, reaching 35% for 
men and 44% for women, and falls somewhat thereafter.5 Notably, the shares of young 
adults who coreside with parents (solid line) and the share of youths who coreside with 
parents and receive intrafamily transfers (dotted line) follow similar patterns, though 
temporal changes are less pronounced. Before the crisis, around 60% of young men and 
47% of young women share housing with parents, whereas during the crisis these shares 
show a moderately upward trend followed by a faint downward trend. Likewise, before 
the crisis around 21% of young men and 24% of young women live with parents and 
receive intra-family cash transfers, but during the crisis these shares jump by 14 and 11 
percentage points, respectively, and fall slightly thereafter. Over the entire period of 
study, the unemployment rate of young men (women) has a correlation of 0.306 (0.491) 
with the share of coresident youths and 0.869 (0.755) with the share of financially 
dependent coresident youths. 
Of course, it is conceivable that this positive correlation can disappear once one controls 
for demographic factors, migration, housing prices etc. To control for such factors in our 
regressions, we use the LFS data to create weighted averages for a range of 
characteristics of the youth population and of the population ages 40-60, which we treat 
as the parents’ generation (We cannot calculate mean characteristics of the actual 
parents because, in the LFS data, we observe only those parents who coreside with their 
                                                     
5 This “super-cyclicality” of youth unemployment is consistent with a general consensus in the literature 
that labor demand for young workers is more responsive to macroeconomic developments compared to 
labor demand for prime-age adults (e.g. Blanchflower and Freeman 2000, Christopoulou 2008, 
Christopoulou and Ryan 2008, Choudhry et al 2012, Christopoulou 2013). 
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children and not those whose children have left the household.6) We complement these 
data with regional indicators from other sources, namely the growth rate of real GDP, 
net migration per capita, and two rental price indexes measuring the minimum and 
maximum rental cost in each region; i.e. the cost in the upmarket and down-market 
neighborhoods, respectively. We draw data on GDP growth and net migration from the 
Eurostat, whereas the rental price indexes are our own calculations as there are no 
available indicators of housing or rental cost at the regional level for Greece. Several 
drawbacks of the regional indicators, including the fact that none is available for the 
entire period of interest, render them imperfect for the purpose of our study. We 
provide further details and plot the data in Christopoulou and Pantalidou (2017).  
 
Table 1. Weighted means and frequencies of selected variables 
 Males  Females 
 2005 2009 2013  2005 2009 2013 
Unemployed (rate) 0.09 0.10 0.35  0.22 0.19 0.44 
Coresidents 0.62 0.60 0.65  0.47 0.47 0.52 
Coresidents and cash recipients 0.22 0.21 0.35  0.26 0.22 0.33 
Age 27.2 27.3 27.5  27.1 27.4 27.3 
Married 0.25 0.21 0.18  0.43 0.40 0.35 
Have child(ren) 0.16 0.14 0.13  0.33 0.33 0.28 
Divorced/widowed 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.02 0.02 0.02 
Housewifes     0.16 0.15 0.10 
Students 0.18 0.20 0.20  0.19 0.21 0.23 
Completed education (years) 11.7 11.9 12.4  12.3 12.6 13.1 
Residents in city 0.42 0.42 0.40  0.44 0.44 0.42 
Residents in rural area 0.18 0.17 0.19  0.15 0.14 0.16 
Income earners from assets 0.02 0.01 0.03  0.03 0.02 0.02 
Income earners from benefits 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.02 0.03 0.03 
Disabled 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                                     
6 A drawback of this approach is that we match youths who have moved out from their home region to 
the parents’ generation in the region of their current residence.  
 
 
6 
In Table 1, we present summary statistics of the demographic trends for the young 
population in selected years. Specifically, we report statistics for 2009, the year that 
marked the beginning of the crisis, and for 2005 and 2013, which correspond to four 
years before and after 2009. The statistics show that the crisis has not only coincided 
with an increase in the interdependence of youths and parents regarding housing and 
income, but also with changes in marital outcomes, fertility, educational attainment, 
and place of residence. Specifically, after 2009 young women appear to abstain from 
their traditional role as home-makers: the downward trend in the share of women who 
are married accelerates, and the share of young women who have children or self-report 
as housewives drops.  While no changes in marital outcomes are apparent for young 
men, both men and women increased their duration of studies and moved from the 
cities to rural areas after the crisis started. 
 
2.2. Methods 
The first step of our empirical analysis is to test whether the correlation of the youth 
unemployment rate and intergenerational dependency survives when we condition 
both on the observable control factors we mentioned above and on region-specific and 
year-specific unobservables. To do this, we estimate two-way fixed-effects panel-data 
models of the following form:  
                             rttrrt
XUY   rt11rt                              (1) 
where rt
Y
 is a measure of intergenerational dependency (either the share of coresident 
youths or the share of youths who coreside and receive some income from other 
household members) in region r and year t; U is the youth unemployment rate; X is a 
vector that includes all other explanatory variables, i.e. the macro-level indicators and 
the characteristics and outcomes of youths and prime-age adults ages 40-60 (the 
population we treat as the parents’ generation); r  represents the unobserved time-
invariant region-effect, t

 is the region-specific year-effect, and rt
h
 is the error term. In 
every case, we estimate (1) for men and women separately. 
Our second step is to test whether the relationship between Y and U changes after the 
beginning of the crisis. To do this, we modify (1) in two equivalent ways: 
                          rttrrtrt
XCrisisUCrisisUY   rt222rt *)1(*            (2) 
                                 rttrrtrt
XCrisisUUY   rt333rt *                               (3) 
where 1 is an all-ones vector and Crisis is a dummy variable that takes values zero in all 
years before 2009 and one in all other years (i.e. during the crisis). These two equations 
give the same information in slightly different forms. The coefficients 2 and 3 are equal 
and reflect the correlation of Y and U before the crisis; γ2 gives the correlation of Y and 
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U during the crisis; and γ3 is the difference between 2 and γ2.  All other coefficient 
estimates of the two equations are equal. Essentially, equation (2) tests the statistical 
significance of the correlation between Y and U separately in the pre-crisis and crisis 
periods, whereas equation (3) is an easy way to test the statistical significance of the 
difference in the correlation between Y and U between the two periods. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Conditional correlations of intergenerational dependency and youth 
unemployment 
We start with the estimation of equation (1) using the percentage of youths who share 
a home with their parents as the dependent variable. Table 2 reports the results from 
three alternative specifications estimated separately for men (columns 1-3) and women 
(columns 4-6). For each gender, the first specification includes only those control 
variables that we construct from the LFS data and, thus, the estimation sample covers 
the entire period of interest from 2002 to 2016. The second specification adds to the set 
of regressors the net migration per capita and the real GDP growth indicators, both of 
which are unavailable for 2016, and therefore the sample size decreases from 195 to 
182. Finally, the third specification includes the two rental cost indexes as additional 
control variables. These indexes are missing in all years before 2007, which causes the 
sample size to decrease further to 117 observations and to be dominated by the period 
of the crisis. Despite this loss of observations, the third specification is our preferred one 
because it is the most conservative and maintains maximum precision. 
Encouragingly, we find that the conditional correlation between youth coresidence and 
unemployment rate is robust irrespective of the specification we estimate. While for 
young men the correlation is always positive and statistically significant, for young 
women it is statistically indistinguishable from zero, and gender differences are always 
significant. The estimated coefficient in the preferred specification for young men 
implies that, for every increase in the youth unemployment rate by 1 percentage point, 
the share of coresident youths increases by an average of 0.445 percentage points. 
For all other explanatory variables, the results show slight differences across 
specifications, but virtually all statistically significant coefficients are plausible. Focusing 
on the preferred specification we find that, for men, coresidence decreases with the 
mean age of the youth population; the share of youths who are married; and the share 
of pensioners and the mean years of education in the parents’ generation. In contrast, 
coresidence among young men increases with the share of disabled both in the youth 
population and in the parent’s generation, and with the rental cost in the down-market 
neighborhoods. For women, coresidence decreases with the share of youths who live in 
urban areas and the share of youths who are married, divorced, or enrolled in education, 
and increases with the share of youths who live in rural areas and with the rental cost in 
the up-market neighborhoods. A somewhat puzzling result, which goes contrary to what 
we find for men, is that disability and coresidence rates for women are negatively 
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associated; i.e. in years and regions where the share of disabled young women is higher 
the share of young women who live with their parents is lower.  
The differences in the results between men and women point to factors that may 
influence intergenerational coresidence which we have not effectively addressed. To 
start with, coresidence may be unresponsive to youth unemployment because it is 
simply determined by cultural norms, which may well be gender-specific. The result that 
coresidence among young women is lower in years and regions with more young rural 
residents or less young urban residents is consistent with this explanation. Rural 
societies are typically more traditional and young women who live in such societies are 
under stricter parental supervision and may not be allowed to live independently.7 Also 
consistent with this explanation is the result that coresidence among young males 
decreases with the rental cost in the down-market neighborhoods, whereas coresidence 
among young women decreases with the cost in the up-scale neighborhoods. Assuming 
that the cheaper neighborhoods are relatively unsafe, young women who adhere to 
cultural gender stereotypes will arguably avoid living there.  
Moreover, coresidence may be driven by the dependency of parents on their children 
rather than the reverse – a fact that could also be culture-related and gender-specific.  
In the regressions of Table 2 we have tried to address reverse causality by controlling 
for the unemployment rate of the parents’ generation, which is statistically insignificant 
in all cases, and a range of other characteristics of that generation. It is reasonable, 
however, that the mismatch between the actual parents and the parents’ generation 
imposed by the data limitations render these controls inadequate. Limiting the 
estimation sample to those young people who live with their parents and receive 
intrafamily cash transfers is one way to circumvent this problem. These youths are 
plausibly the (net) beneficiaries rather than the (net) benefactors of the coresidence 
arrangement and, therefore, their population share can be treated as a measure of 
youth dependency on their parents, as opposed to the share of coresident youths which 
captures both directions of intergenerational dependency.  
We present the corresponding estimation results in Table 3. That is, we estimate 
equation (1) using the percentage of youths who share a home with their parents and 
receive intrafamily transfers as the dependent variable, and report the same 
specifications as in Table 2 and in the same order. Again, the conditional correlations of 
interest are robust across specifications but, this time, they are positive and statistically 
significant for both men and women, though magnitudes differ significantly between 
genders. The preferred specification suggests that, for every increase in the 
unemployment rate of young men by 1 percentage point, the share of young men who 
depend on parents for both housing and income increases by an average of 0.509 
                                                     
7 It is also common to interpret the region-specific fixed-effects as reflecting cultural differences, because 
culture is presumed to change slowly over time. However, in our results this reasoning proves too 
simplistic. In Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix we report estimates of the region-specific effects that 
correspond to the regressions of Tables 2 and 3, respectively. The results are mixed for both men and 
women, and it is not straightforward to link either the regional differences for each gender or the resulting 
gender differences within region to corresponding differences in cultural norms (e.g. there is not clear 
divide in the results between touristic and non-touristic regions or between regions with large cities, like 
Athens and Thessaloniki, and regions with smaller towns.) 
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percentage points, whereas the corresponding increase for young women is only 0.250 
percentage points. 
The results of Table 3 allow us to gain insight into the influence of both reverse causality 
and unobserved cultural factors on the relationship of interest. First, the fact that, for 
young men, the estimated conditional correlations between youth dependency and 
unemployment are of similar magnitude with those reported in Table 2 suggests that 
reverse causality is not an important issue. In contrast, for women, the correlation is 
statistically insignificant in Table 2 and significantly positive in Table 3 which suggests 
that reverse causality plays a role. Excluding from the estimation sample those young 
women who may coreside with parents to provide rather than receive support causes 
the conditional correlation to increase. It follows that, for the excluded sample, the 
unemployment-coresidence relationship is negative; i.e. young women are more likely 
to coreside with dependent parents when youth labour market conditions are favorable 
and vice versa. This makes good sense considering that, when labour market conditions 
are favourable, young women can find work and earn income with which they can 
support parents in need. 
Second, our finding that reverse causality is relevant only in the case of women 
illuminates the role of culture in intergenerational dependency. It suggests that it is 
mostly women, not men, who act as carers for vulnerable parents – a gender-role that 
is consistent with the paradigm of South European familism, according to which “most 
of the caring needs of individuals—children, infirm older and disabled persons, but also 
healthy adult men—are defined as best served by the caring of wives, mothers, and/or 
daughters” (Saraceno 1994, p. 60), but it is also prevalent in countries outside Southern 
Europe (see, for example, Mellor 2001 for evidence from the US). Even after we address 
reverse causality, gender differences in the conditional correlations persist, suggesting 
that young women’s dependency on parents is less responsive to labor market 
conditions than that of young men. Considering our lack of suitable controls for cultural 
norms, this result is also consistent with a cultural interpretation: young women may 
live with and off their parents irrespective of the available employment opportunities 
simply because they are culturally bound to do so. Notably, in Christopoulou and 
Pantalidou (2017) – our closely related paper, where we focus on coresidence and 
control for reverse causality and cultural influences more formally – we reach similar 
conclusions. 
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Table 2. Fixed effects regressions of the share of youths who live with parents 
   Males Females 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Youth unempl. rate 0.303*** 0.260*** 0.455*** 0.095 0.089 0.059 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.091) (0.055) (0.054) (0.068) 
Unempl. rate of parents generation 0.025 -0.073 -0.186 0.041 0.044 0.098 
  (0.226) (0.244) (0.199) (0.137) (0.144) (0.188) 
Mean characteristics of youths      
 Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.028*** -0.014 -0.013 -0.020 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
 Study -0.015 -0.058 -0.008 -0.615*** -0.535*** -0.699*** 
  (0.183) (0.242) (0.235) (0.082) (0.099) (0.146) 
 Years of education -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 -0.016** -0.014** -0.014 
  (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) 
 Married/Cohabitating -0.749*** -0.714*** -0.573** -0.764*** -0.697*** -0.811*** 
  (0.169) (0.175) (0.203) (0.129) (0.144) (0.192) 
 Divorced/Widowed -0.568 -0.429 -0.716 -0.819** -0.599* -1.011* 
  (0.473) (0.527) (0.596) (0.296) (0.327) (0.494) 
 Have child(ren) 0.079 0.034 0.055 0.011 -0.079 0.107 
  (0.252) (0.227) (0.257) (0.103) (0.116) (0.105) 
 Metropolitan area -0.128 -0.188 -0.249 -0.443* -0.467 -0.542** 
  (0.171) (0.223) (0.323) (0.227) (0.278) (0.196) 
 Rural area 0.058 0.090 0.073 0.160*** 0.212*** 0.163* 
  (0.045) (0.054) (0.099) (0.031) (0.018) (0.088) 
 Income from assets 0.191 0.208 0.211 -0.311** -0.422*** -0.382 
  (0.221) (0.240) (0.462) (0.121) (0.094) (0.285) 
 Income from benefits 0.018 -0.140 0.029 0.123 0.269** 0.378 
  (0.234) (0.320) (0.339) (0.111) (0.106) (0.226) 
 Housewife    -0.049 -0.025 0.015 
     (0.055) (0.052) (0.092) 
 Disabled 0.793* 1.017** 1.039* -0.333 -0.336 -1.170** 
  (0.391) (0.410) (0.493) (0.417) (0.341) (0.447) 
Mean characteristics of parents generation     
 Age 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.026 
  (0.024) (0.028) (0.021) (0.012) (0.010) (0.024) 
 Years of education -0.026* -0.022 -0.024* -0.016* -0.019 -0.019 
  (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) 
 Married/Cohabitating 0.246 0.236 0.163 0.052 0.163 0.379 
  (0.326) (0.386) (0.329) (0.118) (0.122) (0.232) 
 Divorced/Widowed -0.070 -0.101 -0.479 0.153 0.152 0.665 
  (0.343) (0.396) (0.536) (0.298) (0.246) (0.542) 
 Pensioner -1.286*** -1.209*** -1.966*** -0.459* -0.557** -0.295 
  (0.279) (0.368) (0.324) (0.242) (0.201) (0.296) 
 Income from assets -0.147 -0.185 -0.270 0.035 0.020 -0.050 
  (0.158) (0.165) (0.246) (0.075) (0.067) (0.115) 
 Income from benefits -0.602 -0.410 -0.855 -0.071 -0.023 0.330 
  (0.481) (0.430) (0.736) (0.230) (0.317) (0.542) 
 Disabled 0.710 0.908* 1.234*** -0.252 -0.211 -0.351 
  (0.497) (0.474) (0.364) (0.371) (0.346) (0.412) 
Net migration per capita  -1.439 -2.821  -2.673*** -1.454 
   (2.107) (3.221)  (0.661) (2.668) 
Growth rate of Real GDP  -0.144* -0.176  -0.013 -0.124 
   (0.067) (0.105)  (0.048) (0.104) 
Minimum rental cost index   0.735***   -0.030 
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transfers  
 
Table 3. Fixed effects regressions of the share of youths who coreside and receive  
intra-family transfers 
 
 
 
  Males Females 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Youth unempl. rate 0.534*** 0.476*** 0.509*** 0.281*** 0.257*** 0.250** 
  (0.092) (0.076) (0.074) (0.079) (0.066) (0.086) 
Unempl. rate of parents generation -0.256 -0.374* -0.357* -0.111 -0.168 -0.121 
  (0.153) (0.186) (0.174) (0.150) (0.123) (0.175) 
Mean characteristics of youths      
 Age -0.023** -
0.034*** 
-0.032** -0.017 -0.020 -0.020 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) 
 Study 0.110 -0.013 -0.048 -0.230 -0.199 -0.208 
  (0.159) (0.197) (0.232) (0.164) (0.179) (0.175) 
 Years of education 0.013 0.017 0.023 -0.019** -0.017* -0.024** 
  (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
 Married/Cohabitating -0.005 -0.001 0.181 -
0.339*** 
-0.267** -0.272 
  (0.164) (0.153) (0.170) (0.102) (0.102) (0.189) 
 Divorced/Widowed 0.918** 0.968* 0.764 -0.408 -0.249 -0.368 
  (0.400) (0.496) (0.463) (0.231) (0.273) (0.437) 
 Have child(ren) -0.002 0.033 -0.231 -0.026 -0.120 -0.108 
  (0.148) (0.120) (0.147) (0.127) (0.109) (0.126) 
 Metropolitan area 0.078 -0.236 -0.204 -0.168 -0.057 -0.095 
  (0.127) (0.144) (0.210) (0.105) (0.067) (0.191) 
 Rural area 0.028 0.005 -0.119 0.012 0.095* 0.062 
  (0.069) (0.071) (0.111) (0.049) (0.044) (0.064) 
 Income from assets -0.271 -0.072 -0.076 -0.124 -0.276* -0.168 
  (0.178) (0.137) (0.298) (0.162) (0.142) (0.300) 
 Income from benefits 0.155 0.104 -0.124 0.377** 0.543*** 0.565*** 
  (0.199) (0.278) (0.384) (0.140) (0.145) (0.170) 
 Housewife    0.074 0.109 0.171 
     (0.076) (0.074) (0.120) 
 Disabled 0.978** 0.968** 1.209*** -
1.361*** 
-
1.598*** 
-2.608*** 
  (0.439) (0.410) (0.303) (0.435) (0.300) (0.562) 
Mean characteristics of parents generation     
 Age 0.009 0.002 0.018 -0.020 -0.014 -0.021 
  (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) 
 Years of education -0.009 -0.007 -0.024 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 
  (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
 Married/Cohabitating 0.184 0.111 -0.030 -0.050 0.082 0.233 
  (0.281) (0.322) (0.351) (0.209) (0.213) (0.342) 
 Divorced/Widowed 0.198 0.334 -0.220 0.537 0.394 1.014* 
  (0.437) (0.461) (0.543) (0.475) (0.459) (0.536) 
 Pensioner -
0.905*** 
-0.577 -0.835 -0.711** -
0.984*** 
-1.088** 
  (0.212) (0.331) (0.513) (0.318) (0.265) (0.367) 
 Income from assets 0.419** 0.382** 0.420 0.139 0.146 0.180 
  (0.157) (0.160) (0.243) (0.132) (0.116) (0.160) 
 Income from benefits -0.700 -0.879 -0.683 -1.364** -1.118** -0.474 
  (0.552) (0.525) (0.846) (0.454) (0.477) (0.645) 
 Disabled 0.083 0.042 -0.261 -0.240 -0.293 -0.776 
  (0.304) (0.299) (0.477) (0.386) (0.369) (0.588) 
Net migration per capita  0.441 -0.138  -
3.128*** 
-4.141** 
   (1.421) (2.368)  (0.977) (1.500) 
Growth rate of Real GDP  -0.038 -0.132  -0.110 -0.267*** 
   (0.106) (0.109)  (0.064) (0.081) 
Minimum rental cost index   0.474   0.004 
    (0.322)   (0.272)  
Maximum rental cost index   0.014   0.022 
    (0.027)   (0.029) 
Constant 0.057 0.776 0.060 2.127** 1.798* 2.075** 
  (0.902) (1.257) (1.399) (0.896) (0.899) (0.924) 
Observations 195 182 117 195 182 117 
R-squared adjusted 0.867 0.859 0.893 0.758 0.772 0.803 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: region & year dummies. 
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Few of the remaining explanatory variables in Table 3 are statistically significant, 
especially when one looks at the preferred specification. Interestingly, the share of 
young men who depend on parents for both housing and income has a significant 
association with the unemployment rate in the parents’ generation and in the expected 
direction. The more adverse the labour market conditions for the parents’ generation 
the lower the share of dependent young men. Dependency of young men also decreases 
with the average age in the youth population and increases with the share of disabled 
youths.  
Contrary to men, whether young women rely on parents for housing and income is 
unrelated to the unemployment rate in the parents’ generation. The share of dependent 
young women increases with the share of young women who receive income from 
benefits and with the share of divorced or widowed individuals in the parents’ 
generation, and it decreases with youth educational attainment, the share of pensioners 
in the parent’s generation, net migration per capita, and the growth rate of real GDP. 
The odd result that dependency among young women decreases as the share of disabled 
young women increases, which we observed in Table 2, is also present here. We are 
inclined to interpret this result as a spurious correlation caused by a confounding 
variable that is not immediately evident, searching for which is beyond the scope of this 
analysis. 
 
3.2 Changes in the dependency-unemployment correlations after the beginning of the 
crisis 
We next test whether and to what degree the conditional correlations between 
dependency and unemployment change after the beginning of the economic crisis. In 
Table 4 we report estimates of equations (2) and (3) using as the dependent variable 
both the share of coresident youths (panel A) and the share of financially dependent 
coresident youths (panel B). These estimates result from specifications that control for 
all available characteristics of youths, all available characteristics of the parent’s 
generation, net migration, and GDP growth (i.e. they correspond to the specifications 
reported in columns (2) and (5) in Tables 2 and 3). The reason we choose this 
specification is because it is the most conservative among those that leave a large 
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enough sample to allow for a viable test (this concerns the pre-crisis sample 
particularly).  As always, we estimate regressions for young men and women separately.  
Table 4. Testing for a crisis effect 
Fixed-effects regressions of % of coresidents and transfer recipients, ages 18-35, 2002-2015 
  Males  Females 
  A. Share of youths who coreside 
Youth unemployment 
rate      
 Pre-crisis -0.109 -0.109  0.019 0.019 
  (0.145) (0.145)  (0.065) (0.065) 
 Crisis 0.402***   0.134**  
  (0.080)   (0.050)  
 Difference  0.511**   0.115** 
   (0.199)   (0.040) 
Observations 182 182  182 182 
R-squared adjusted 0.643 0.643  0.811 0.811 
      
  
B. Share of youths who coreside & receive intra-family 
transfers 
Youth unemployment 
rate      
 Pre-crisis 0.501*** 0.501***  0.258*** 0.258*** 
  (0.141) (0.141)  (0.068) (0.068) 
 Crisis 0.466***   0.256***  
  (0.072)   (0.075)  
 Difference  -0.035   -0.001 
   (0.135)   (0.058) 
Observations 182 182  182 182 
R-squared adjusted 0.859 0.859  0.771 0.771 
Controls: as in columns (2) and (5) in Tables (2) and (3). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Our results reveal that the statistically significant coresidence-unemployment 
correlation that we found for men in Table 2 is driven by the period of the crisis, whereas 
the statistically insignificant correlation we found for women is driven by the period 
before the crisis. More precisely, before the crisis, youth unemployment is statistically 
unrelated with the share of coresident youths and this holds for both men and women. 
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During the crisis, the correlation becomes statistically significant for both genders – 
though, once again, it is much higher for men than for women, reminding us the 
pertinence of culture and reverse causality.  The difference in the correlations between 
periods is also statistically significant for both genders.  
The implication is that the crisis has caused the intergenerational dependency in the 
Greek families to strengthen; i.e. it has led to an increase in the share of youths who 
coreside with their parents because they cannot afford to live independently. We note 
that it is possible that there is a small pre-crisis correlation between coresidence and 
unemployment that is not picked up by the data due to their aggregate nature and the 
short time-span of the sub-periods. Regardless, the main message remains: the 
beginning of the crisis coincides with a structural break that leaves more vulnerable 
young Greeks sharing housing with parents. This finding is to our knowledge unique in 
the empirical literature and stems from the severity of the Greek recession and the 
shortage of alternative safety nets for young Greeks. To give an example, Bitler and 
Hoynes (2015) carried out the same test for structural breaks using data from the United 
States over 1981-2014; i.e. their sample included both the recessions of the 1980s and 
the recent ‘great’ recession, but none of their structural-break hypotheses was 
supported by their results.   
Interestingly, our result does not survive when we limit the sample to those young 
coresidents who receive some income from other family members. The conditional 
correlations between youth unemployment and the share of youths who live with and 
off their parents are statistically significant both before and during the crisis, and 
statistically equal when comparing the two periods. This result has two important 
implications. First, it implies that the exceptionally adverse labor market conditions for 
young adults brought about by the crisis caused more Greek families to provide housing 
for their young adult members, but it did not cause more Greek families to provide both 
housing and income. The economic hardship induced by the crisis, however, was so 
generalized that this does not come as a surprise. Adults of all ages saw significant cuts 
in their wages (Christopoulou and Monastiriotis 2014, 2016) and older individuals saw 
cuts in pensions and increases in the retirement age (Leventi and Matsagkanis 2016). 
Financially supporting their young members was, thus, not an option for most Greek 
families.  
The second implication is that reverse causality for young men, which could not be 
detected before breaking the sample into sub-periods, is evidently present before the 
crisis. Excluding from the sample of coresident youths those who do not receive cash 
transfers (i.e. those who potentially coreside in order to support vulnerable parents) 
causes the pre-crisis correlation to increase for both men and women, whereas during 
the crisis this happens for women only. Thus, reverse causality is relevant for both 
genders before the crisis, but during the crisis it disappears completely for men and 
weakens for women. To put it in simpler terms, the intergenerational dependency 
before the Greek crisis ran both directions; i.e. better-off youths would support parents 
in need and better-off parents would support youths in need. However, after the crisis 
started, the intergenerational dependency for men became one-directional, with youths 
being on the receiving end of support, whereas, for women, it remained two-directional 
but also skewed towards youths. This result is clearly symptomatic of the 
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disproportionate economic distress imposed on the younger relative to the older 
generations during the crisis. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper was motivated by the observation that, despite the extremely adverse 
conditions in the youth labor market during the Greek crisis, the youth population 
endured.  We examined whether and to what degree this became possible due to 
intrafamilial support, given that the Greek family has traditionally operated as the 
primary safety net available to vulnerable youths. To carry out our analysis, we 
estimated correlations of youth unemployment with two main variables: the share of 
young people who coreside with their parents, as a proxy of two-way intergenerational 
dependence, and the share of young people who coreside with their parents and receive 
intrafamilial transfers, as a proxy of one-way dependence (of youths on their parents).  
Our results showed that the influence of youth unemployment on coresidence is 
virtually non-existent before the crisis and positive and significant thereafter. In 
contrast, youth unemployment and the share of financially dependent coresident 
youths have a positive and significant correlation throughout the period of study and 
there is no change in this correlation after the beginning of the crisis. In both cases, the 
correlations are higher for men relative to women and are conditional on a range of 
characteristics of young people and their parents’ generation and on several other 
regional indicators that capture developments outside the labor market.  
These results have a number of important implications.  They confirm that familial 
interdependence was the norm in Greece well before the crisis, but they also show that 
the crisis worked to reinforce this interdependence and altered its nature. Before the 
crisis, financially comfortable youths would support vulnerable parents and financially 
comfortable parents would support vulnerable youths. During the crisis, youths became 
mostly beneficiaries and parents became mostly benefactors. In fact, to protect their 
adult children from the impact of the crisis, parents responded by providing housing and 
not by providing both housing and income, which is telling of their own financial 
difficulties. Interestingly, parents “rescued” more young men than women, but this was 
likely because young women were already safely protected in the parental nest, 
adhering to their traditional gender-role. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Region-specific fixed-effects from the regressions presented in Table 2 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Kentriki Makedonia 0.155 0.193 0.269* 0.352*** 0.370*** 0.345*** 
  (0.121) (0.150) (0.160) (0.105) (0.114) (0.125) 
Dytiki Makedonia 0.058** 0.056* 0.156*** 0.054*** 0.038** 0.068** 
  (0.027) (0.029) (0.051) (0.017) (0.018) (0.030) 
Ipeiros 0.061** 0.056* 0.186*** 0.007 0.000 0.030 
  (0.030) (0.032) (0.055) (0.017) (0.018) (0.033) 
Thessalia 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.117*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) (0.014) (0.016) (0.023) 
Ionia Nisia 0.018 0.015 -0.265** -0.040* -0.052** -0.020 
  (0.040) (0.042) (0.103) (0.023) (0.024) (0.085) 
Dytiki Ellada 0.039 0.036 -0.232** 0.047*** 0.036** 0.067 
  (0.026) (0.028) (0.099) (0.017) (0.018) (0.085) 
Sterea Ellada 0.064** 0.061* 0.130*** 0.012 0.020 0.013 
  (0.029) (0.032) (0.036) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) 
Attiki 0.243 0.287 0.366 0.534*** 0.564*** 0.448** 
  (0.189) (0.235) (0.250) (0.157) (0.171) (0.194) 
Peloponnisos 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.040 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.035 
  (0.033) (0.037) (0.052) (0.015) (0.015) (0.041) 
Voreio Aigaio 0.031 0.018 -0.041 -0.022 -0.024 -0.010 
  (0.030) (0.034) (0.048) (0.016) (0.018) (0.046) 
Notio Aigaio 0.051** 0.050* 0.155*** -0.009 -0.011 -0.088** 
  (0.024) (0.028) (0.043) (0.015) (0.016) (0.040) 
Kriti 0.041* 0.043 0.128*** -0.005 0.001 -0.010 
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.040) (0.014) (0.013) (0.029) 
Note: reference category is Anatoliki Makedonia and Thraki. 
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Table A2. Region-specific fixed-effects from the regressions presented in Table 3 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Kentriki Makedonia 0.023 0.197* 0.204 0.137 0.082 0.068 
  (0.103) (0.108) (0.141) (0.098) (0.100) (0.140) 
Dytiki Makedonia 0.043** 0.049** 0.107** 0.062*** 0.043** 0.061* 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.045) (0.017) (0.020) (0.035) 
Ipeiros 0.060*** 0.060** 0.125** 0.029* 0.015 0.029 
  (0.021) (0.024) (0.048) (0.016) (0.021) (0.043) 
Thessalia 0.039** 0.031 0.035 0.039*** 0.037** 0.040 
  (0.018) (0.023) (0.029) (0.014) (0.015) (0.027) 
Ionia Nisia 0.016 0.018 -0.141 -0.043 -0.070** -0.059 
  (0.031) (0.032) (0.125) (0.029) (0.028) (0.108) 
Dytiki Ellada 0.024 0.029 -0.152 0.029 0.016 0.015 
  (0.020) (0.024) (0.119) (0.019) (0.020) (0.109) 
Sterea Ellada 0.053** 0.043* 0.065* 0.015 0.016 0.029 
  (0.023) (0.025) (0.033) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) 
Attiki 0.019 0.276 0.265 0.178 0.101 0.047 
  (0.160) (0.170) (0.239) (0.149) (0.152) (0.218) 
Peloponnisos 0.053** 0.045 -0.000 0.017 0.011 0.017 
  (0.026) (0.029) (0.060) (0.019) (0.018) (0.050) 
Voreio Aigaio 0.012 0.010 -0.062 0.003 -0.013 -0.005 
  (0.020) (0.026) (0.060) (0.021) (0.023) (0.056) 
Notio Aigaio 0.018 0.015 0.058 -0.016 -0.024 -0.053 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.043) (0.019) (0.019) (0.045) 
Kriti 0.006 -0.004 0.049 -0.016 -0.016 -0.029 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.037) (0.016) (0.016) (0.036) 
Note: reference category is Anatoliki Makedonia and Thraki. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
Previous Papers in this Series 
128: Antigone Lyberaki, Platon Tinios, Long-term Care, Ageing and Gender in the 
Greek Crisis, September 2018 
127. Persefoni Zeri, Charalambos Tsekeris, Theodore Tsekeris, Investigating the 
Macedonia Naming Dispute in the Twitter Era: Implications for the Greek Identity 
Crisis, July 2018 
126. Roumanias Costas, Skouras Spyros, Christodoulakis Nikos Crisis and Extremism: 
Can a Powerful Extreme Right Emerge in a Modern Democracy? Evidence from 
Greece’s Golden Dawn, June 2018 
125. Christopoulou Rebekka, Monastiriotis Vassilis Did the crisis make the Greek 
economy less inefficient? Evidence from the structure and dynamics of sectoral 
premia, May 2018 
124. Glyniadaki Katerina Judge, Nudge, or Engage? Gender-related pressures and 
responses among street-level bureaucrats working with migrants, April, 2018 
123. Chalari Athanasia, Serifi Panagiota, The Crisis Generation: the effect of the Greek 
Crisis on Youth Identity Formation, March, 2018 
122. Christopoulou Rerbekka, Pantalidou, Maria, The parental home as labour market 
insurance for young Greeks during the crisis, February, 2008 
121. Stavridis Stelios, Greek parliamentarians and Greek foreign policy (2004-2014), 
January 2018 
120. Huliaras Asteris, Sotiropoulos Dimitris, The crisis in Greece: The semi-rentier 
state hypothesis, January 2018  
119. Zafiropoulou Maria, Pérez Alejandro, Christodoulopoulou Archontia, Peeva 
Radina, Marini Ioanna, Winners and Losers of the Greek Crisis as a Result of a Double 
Fragmentation and Exclusion: a Discourse Analysis of Greek Civil Society, December 
2017 
 
